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The current study employed the self-validation hypothesis (Petty, Brinol, &
Tormala, 2002) to test how thought confidence affects individuals’ responses to social
norms regarding gay rights. After measuring their gay rights attitudes and thought
confidence, participants took part in a discussion where they faced groups that either
opposed their position on gay rights unanimously or non-unanimously (i.e., 4 opposing
confederates vs. 3 opposing confederates and one supporting confederate). Those who
were anti-gay rights conformed more than those pro, particularly when facing unanimous
opposition. Thought confidence reduced the effects of normative pressure on conformity,
but only in those who were anti-gay rights. Attitude change was reduced for anti-gay
rights people with high thought confidence, but only when a supporting confederate was
present. These results suggest that thought confidence affects resistance to social norms
in people who are anti-gay rights whereas pro-gay rights people resist regardless of their
level of thought confidence.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Overview
In his text, The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) argued that much of the
etiology of prejudice could be accounted for by conformity to social norms. In the time
since Allport presented his argument, research has consistently demonstrated that social
influence plays an important role in the development and expression of prejudicial
attitudes (see Crandall & Stangor, 2005 for a review). Research has also shown that the
expression of such prejudicial attitudes is often manifested in the symbolic form of
resistance to distributive social justice policies (see Fiske, 1998). Accordingly, it stands
to reason that one’s willingness to endorse certain social policies (e.g., affirmative action,
hate crime legislation) may be influenced by social norms. Given the pervasive power of
social influence, it begs the question: who resists? In the present study I examined why
certain individuals are more resistant than others to the influence of social norms on one's
willingness to adopt the normative position on social justice policies.
Compared to our understanding of the reasons why individuals succumb to the
persuasive power of social influence, the extent to which certain individuals may be
resistant to it is less understood. One possible reason why individuals have varying
levels of resistance to persuasion is the self-validation hypothesis (Petty, Brinol, &
Tormala, 2002). The self-validation hypothesis posits that thought confidence, or the
1

degree of validity that individuals perceive their thoughts to possess, affects their
resistance to persuasion. Specifically, research has shown thought confidence to play an
important role in determining susceptibility to persuasive messages. High confidence in
the validity of one’s thoughts about the persuasive message can increase susceptibility
when response to the message is viewed as positive or can increase resistance when
response to the message is viewed as negative (Petty, Brinol, & Tormala, 2002; Tormala,
Rucker & Seger, 2008). A goal of the present study is to extend this research and
examine how thought confidence affects people’s resistance to group norms regarding
social policy issues.
The Expression of Prejudice and Social Policy
Prejudice is defined as a negative attitude toward a group or members of the
group (Stangor, 2009). Though the expression of prejudice takes many forms in today’s
culture, the prevailing expression of prejudice has changed. In particular, overt
expressions of prejudice have become increasingly socially unacceptable (Sniderman &
Carmines, 1997). Although this trend may seem encouraging, research in social
psychology has shown that many subtle forms of prejudice (e.g., symbolic, subtle, and
aversive racism) persist (Fiske, 1998). One way that prejudiced beliefs are voiced in a
social climate that is intolerant of overt prejudice is via resistance to distributive social
justice policies (e.g., gay marriage, hate crime legislation, and anti-discrimination laws).
With several salient policy issues concerning homosexuals in the current U.S. political
climate it would appear that examining gay rights would have particular relevance when
studying sexual prejudice. As such, the current study focused on social justice policies
concerning gay men and lesbians.
2

Investigating sexual prejudice in terms of social policy attitudes provides an
important advantage over only looking at biases in terms of attitudes towards groups or
members of groups. Although individuals are reluctant to report overtly biased attitudes,
they are likely more willing to express biased attitudes under the guise of a socially
acceptable principled objection to a political issue. Therefore, in the interest of
uncovering prejudicial attitudes in their subtle form, that I will examine prejudice in
terms of social policy attitudes.
Social Norms and Social Justice
Allport (1954) has identified social norms as a key contributor in the development
and expression of prejudice. A small but strong body of research supports the role of
social norms in the expression of prejudice by showing that individuals will inhibit the
expression of prejudice if the prevailing social norm conveys that prejudice is
unacceptable (see Crandall & Stangor, 2005 for review). For example, Crandall,
Eshleman, and O’ Brien (2002) found that the extent to which an individual expressed a
prejudicial or tolerant view of a particular group (e.g., African Americans, homosexuals)
was closely linked to their perceptions of what others felt was appropriate. Social norms
can be also used to change beliefs about social policies by conveying normative support
for a given social policy (Shultz, Tabanico, & Rendon, 2008). Furthermore, a study by
Pitman (2008) showed that the strongest predictor for the reported willingness to engage
in social justice behaviors (e.g., challenging others on derogatory comments, taking
political action, and facilitating intergroup dialogue) was the perception that the social
norm endorsed engaging in social justice behavior.
3

In addition to correlations between norms and the expression of prejudice—in
both overt and covert (social justice policies) forms—we can also see the causal function
of norms and prejudice in experimental research where the social norm is manipulated.
In one such study, Clark and Maass (1990) recruited individuals who held neutral
attitudes on the issue of gay rights and subjected them to varying levels of majority
influence. When the majority against gay rights increased in number, the influence of the
minority for gay rights decreased such that individuals’ gay rights attitudes became more
reflective of the majority position (i.e., against gay rights).
Furthermore, this social influence effect—whereby individuals’ policy attitudes
are disproportionately influenced by the majority position—has been found to be even
more prevalent when the position being advocated was either consistent with the larger
population’s norm or was perceived as potentially becoming the more popular opinion
(Clark & Maass, 1990; Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997; Shamir, 1997). Pro-gay rights
attitudes fit these conditions, as according to Gallup polls, Americans’ acceptance of
homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle has now crossed the 50% mark. Thus, given that
holding pro-gay rights attitudes is becoming a larger part of the societal norm, adherence
to social norms regarding the expression of prejudice may depend on the position – in
favor versus opposed to gay rights – which is being advocated. Specifically, the position
which is perceived to be more consistent with the larger societal norm should be more
influential.
In addition to the perceived societal support that those in favor of gay rights are
garnering, it is also possible that a nonprejudiced norm simply exerts more social
influence that a prejudiced norm. For instance, a two-part study looking at both racial
4

and sexual bias respectively showed that the act of priming a nonprejudiced norm
decreased the amount of racial bias in reported opinions and increased support for gay
rights initiatives (Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996). Specific to sexual prejudice,
when those opposed to gay rights were assigned to conditions where they were told the
majority was pro-gay rights they expressed more positive attitudes towards homosexuals
when anticipating discussion about the topic. Notably, the presentation of a prejudiced
norm did not decrease support for gay rights. This finding suggests that social norms that
oppose prejudice are stronger than social norms favoring prejudice in getting individuals
to conform to the norm. Presumably, a nonprejudiced norm activates the larger societal
norm that expressing prejudice is a disapproved behavior. Therefore, it could be argued
that individuals who are in favor of gay rights may be more resistant to changing their
attitudes in response to a norm opposing their beliefs than those who oppose gay rights.
Thought Confidence and Persuasion
In addition to situational factors like exposure to the norms governing the
expression of prejudice and policy attitudes, certain aspects of the individual may be
important in explaining whether individuals might adopt or revise certain policy attitudes
when exposed to social influence. Recent research in persuasion has produced a new
determinant of susceptibility to persuasion called thought confidence. The self-validation
hypothesis posits that the amount of confidence that one has in his or her thoughts is a
determinant of whether or not one’s thoughts about a given issue will yield attitudes
strong enough to guide behavior (Petty, Tormala, & Brinol, 2002).
Conceptually, thoughts can be differentiated from attitudes by understanding that
thoughts are in essence the cognitive outcome of a process (thinking), and can be the
5

cognitive rationale behind an attitude, whereas an attitude is a specific orientation
(including cognition and affect, and potentially guiding behavior) that one holds or
expresses towards an object. Therefore, one’s thoughts may support one’s attitudes. In
fact, Petty et al. (2002) showed that individuals with higher thought confidence exhibited
a greater thought-attitude relationship, meaning that their thoughts were more integral in
forming their attitude.
Petty’s research also provided the preliminary evidence for the potential of
thought confidence in predicting persuadability. Petty et al. (2002) showed that thought
confidence is an important determinant of one’s susceptibility to persuasion such that a
high confidence in the validity of one’s thoughts can either increase or decrease the
likelihood that one is persuaded. However, the impact of thought confidence on
persuasion was moderated by how positively or negatively individuals responded to the
persuasive message. When individuals reported higher confidence in their thoughts but
had a negative valence in their thoughts about the persuasive message, they showed
decreased susceptibility to the persuasive message compared to those who had low
confidence in their thoughts. When individuals had a high level of confidence in their
thoughts but reported a positive valence in their thoughts generated in response to a
persuasive message, they showed an increased susceptibility to the persuasive message.
The combined effects of thought confidence and valence of response to a persuasive
message was termed the self-validation hypothesis.
Since the self-validation hypothesis was initially presented, the basic effect of
thought confidence as a determinant of susceptibility to persuasion has been replicated
(Brinol & Petty, 2003; Brinol, Petty, & Tormala, 2008). However, research on thought
6

confidence has largely been confined to issues such as attitudes about advertising or
comprehensive exit exams (Brinol & Petty, 2009). Although maintaining a narrow focus
on the topic of the persuasive message likely has several benefits, doing so presents
several limitations. The role of thought confidence in the development of affect-laden
attitudes has yet to be determined. Research has shown that affect-laden attitudes are
more resistant to change and are more predictive of behavior (see Fiske, 1998, for
review). Gay rights attitudes are one such example of affect-laden attitudes (Herek,
2009). As such, I am interested in understanding what role thought confidence might
play when affect-laden political attitudes are involved.
An additional limitation of previous research on thought confidence is that a
relatively limited number of social influence sources (e.g., university Board of Trustees
and advertisements) have been studied. One of the most potent sources of social
influence identified by social psychological research is social norms (Goldstein &
Cialdini, 2007). Although social norms have been used in the past to manipulate thought
confidence, it has yet to be determined how thought confidence affects the way in which
people navigate persuasive social norms. As such, in the current study I sought to apply
the self-validation hypothesis to the question of why some individuals respond differently
to the persuasiveness of social norms. Although very little research has been conducted
on the role of thought confidence in social norms, some conjecture can be offered on this
issue. To the extent individuals’ thought confidence is high, those who are in favor of
gay rights might show an increased resistance to a persuasive message opposing gay
rights as they are likely to produce negative valence in their thoughts in response to a
persuasive anti-gay rights message if they perceive such a message to be discriminatory.
7

Conversely, individuals who are opposed to gay rights might produce a positive valence
to a norm that is contrary to their position on gay rights if they view the pro-gay rights
persuasive message to endorse norms of egalitarianism. Thus, valence may be another
factor which might explain why those in favor of gay rights are more resistant to
changing the direction of their attitudes about gay rights than those who are opposed to
gay rights, as was shown in the study by Monteith, Deneen, and Tooman (1996).
An additional limitation of previous work on thought confidence has been that it
involved issues about which individuals may or may not have pre-existing attitudes.
Thus, it has yet to be determined what role one's pre-existing thought confidence
(perceived validity of thoughts generated about an issue prior to a persuasive attempt)
might play in affecting individuals’ resolve when it comes to conforming to a persuasive
group norm and subsequently changing one’s attitude to match that norm.
Examining the role of pre-existing thought confidence is particularly important
here as, presumably, individuals have periodically engaged in the self-validation
processes for their thoughts on the policy issues relevant to our study [i.e., have
encountered messages on political positions (through the media, classes, peers, family)
which trigger thought generation and affective responses to those messages] and thus
may carry a trait level thought confidence on any given issue. In the interest of
ecological validity, I sought to expand research on thought confidence by examining
thought confidence prior to a persuasive message. The role of pre-existing thought
confidence in resistance to persuasion on affect-laden issues like social policies about gay
rights has yet to be examined. Therefore, I sought to explore how individuals might use
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self-validation to respond to persuasive social policy messages about gay rights and the
social influences that often dictate these policy attitudes.
The Current Study
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of social norms on the public
and private expression of gay rights policy attitudes. The current study also sought to
examine how people’s level of confidence in their thoughts about several gay rights
issues would influence their susceptibility to conforming to the group or changing their
pre-existing attitudes. To examine this, participants were assigned to conditions with a
high, medium, or low thought confidence manipulation. Following thought confidence
manipulations, participants were placed into discussion groups that either unanimously
opposed their position on gay rights or a non-unanimous opposition condition where a
confederate advocated the participants’ position but with the majority still on the opposite
side of the issue. Following the group discussion participants were given private postdiscussion measures of valence towards the group discussion and gay rights attitudes.
Dependent measures included the participants voting responses in the group discussion
and their private post-discussion self-reported attitudes.
My hypotheses were as follows:
H1: Consistent with literature highlighting that non-prejudiced norms are more
influential than prejudiced norms (Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996), those who are
initially anti-gay rights were expected to show more public conformity and norm
consistent attitude change than those who were initially pro-gay rights.
H2: Consistent with literature showing that a larger group majority is more
effective in changing gay rights attitudes than a smaller majority (Clark & Maass, 1990),
9

those who were placed in the unanimous opposition condition were expected to show
more public conformity to the group and norm consistent attitude change than those in
non-unanimous opposition condition.
H3: Individuals with lower confidence in their thoughts about gay rights policies
were expected to show more public conformity and norm consistent attitude change than
those with higher confidence in their thoughts about gay rights policies, especially in the
unanimous opposition condition. However, research by Petty, Brinol, and Tormala
(2002) has shown that when facing a persuasive message, high confidence in one’s
thoughts opposing the message paired with a negative valence in these thoughts leads to
decreased persuasion. As such, people who are high in thought confidence and
experience negative valence in their thoughts about the arguments of the group may be
particularly resistant to changing their attitudes. Finally, given that those anti-gay rights
are expected to show higher conformity than those who are pro-gay rights it is expected
that the most overall conformity and attitude change will be shown by anti-gay rights
people facing the most challenging conditions (i.e., low thought confidence and
unanimous group opposition). In contrast, the least overall conformity and attitude
change should be shown by pro-gay rights people facing the least challenging conditions
(i.e., high thought confidence and non-unanimous group opposition).

10

CHAPTER II
METHODS

Participants and Design
A sample of 283 students from Mississippi State University volunteered for a
study called the “Political Psychology Project” in exchange for course credit. Of the
initial 283 participants, 191 participants completed both Parts 1 and 2 of the study, the
remainder choosing not to attend Part 2 1. The majority of participants were female
(57.2%) and either Caucasian (61.1%) or African American (29.7%). Participants ranged
in age from 18-32, with an average age of 18.90 (SD = 1.48). The three most common
political affiliations were Republican (46.6%), Democrat (27.9%), and Independent
(12.7%). Participants were identified in the screening survey as being for (n = 140) or
against gay rights (n = 143) and were randomly assigned to conditions inside of a 2 (Preexisting Position: Pro vs. Anti) × 3 (Thought Confidence manipulation: high, medium,
and low) × 2 (Normative Pressure: Unanimous opposition vs. Non unanimous
opposition) P × E quasi-experimental factorial design.

1

No statistically significant differences were found for attitude extremity, initial gay rights attitudes, and
demographic variables in choosing to return to Part 2.

11

Materials and Procedure
This study employed a two-part methodology. Part 1 consisted of a screening
survey used to classify participants as either being pro or anti gay rights. Part 2 occurred
approximately two weeks after Part 1 and began with participants receiving a thought
confidence manipulation and manipulation check in private. Participants were then
placed in a group discussion which consisted of an initial public practice vote about local
campus policies, followed by a public voting session about gay rights, an open-ended
group discussion about gay rights, a revote on the pre-discussion gay rights voting topics,
and finally a private post-discussion measures of participants’ valence towards the group
discussion and a “final word” attitude change measure. Each component will be
reviewed in turn.
Part 1: Screening Survey
In Part 1, participants were given a consent form and survey (see Appendices B &
C). The initial portion of the survey assessed a variety of demographics including the
participants’ religion, race, gender, age, political affiliation, and voting behavior.
Political position. Next, participants completed the Political Beliefs Inventory, an
87-item questionnaire assessing their views on, among other topics, gay rights (refer to
Appendix C). Political Position was a group classification variable based on the
participants’ initial attitudes on gay rights. This variable was determined using a 7-point
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) which included 6 items.
Participants responded to the following questions:
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Homosexuals should be able to marry, legally. (reverse scored)
Sexual orientation should be included as a protected class in antidiscrimination policies. (reverse scored)
Sexual orientation should be included as a protected class in anti-hate
crime laws. (reverse scored)
Homosexuals should be able to adopt children. (reverse scored)
The armed forces are right to exclude homosexuals from military service.
Employers should provide health care benefits to the partners of their gay
and lesbian employees. (reverse scored)

These six items were averaged to compute a total gay rights score with higher
scores representing more anti-gay rights attitudes and lower scores representing more pro.
Reliability of this scale was strong (α = .86). For the purpose of identification for
discussion assignment (i.e., either being assigned to a pro- or anti-gay rights majority),
participants who scored above a “5” were “anti” gay rights (n = 94) and those who scored
below a "3" were "pro” (n = 95). Participants who scored in the range of 3-5 were
considered “neutral” with those below “4” considered “neutral-for” (n = 47) and those
above “4” considered “neutral-against” (n = 39). For the purpose of condition
assignment of neutral persons, adjustments were made by including scores on items from
four general gay rights policy items which included: “Gays and Lesbians who adopt
children need to be monitored more closely than heterosexual parents”, “Homosexuals
should have the same rights as heterosexuals”, “Homosexuals still need to protest for
equal rights”, and “Homosexuals do not have all the rights they need.” If still “neutral”,
participant responses to the Raja and Stokes Modern Homophobia Scale (1998) were
used for further adjustment.
Thought listing task. Following the completion of the Political Positions
Inventory, participants were instructed to briefly provide their reasoning behind their
13

responses on questions about policies about the environment, immigration, and gay
rights. Participants were asked to write about each issue separately in the space provided
to them for each item. These open ended responses served as the basis of the false
feedback received in Part 2.
Part 2: Experiment
Upon completion of the survey in Part 1, participants were told to come back to
the lab at a later date for Part 2 of the experiment in which they would participate in a
discussion of a political topic with other MSU students. Thus, approximately two weeks
after completing the screening survey, participants returned to the lab to participate in the
discussion portion of the study. Participants were first separated into individual rooms to
receive an experimental thought confidence false feedback manipulation and
manipulation check. After completing the manipulation check participants were then
moved to a conference room where they participated in a group discussion about gay
rights that involved a series of pre-discussion voting sets, a 20 minute open ended
discussion, and a post-discussion revote before receiving post-discussion measures of
valence and attitude change. The experimental process is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Experimental Process
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Independent Variables
Thought confidence manipulation. At the beginning of Part 2 of the study
participants were separated into individual pod rooms to receive a packet of prediscussion measures which included a false feedback thought confidence manipulation
and an argument rating filler task, and a manipulation check inventory (see Appendices
D, E, and F respectively). At this time participants were told by an experimenter that we
were interested in examining the nature and quality of the thoughts that people have
about political policies. The experimenter further elaborated that we were interested in
evaluating the quality of arguments before and after the discussion and that each
participant was being asked to provide an evaluation of written peer arguments from prior
surveys. Participants were then informed that allegedly, in advance of their arrival, two
other randomly selected students participating in an earlier session had read their
arguments anonymously, and rated the quality of those arguments.
Thought confidence was manipulated by providing the false feedback to
participants about the arguments they provided in the open-ended portion of the screening
survey. False feedback was provided on immigration, environmental, and gay rights
issues by two anonymous raters shown as “Rater 1” and “Rater 2.” The false feedback
was provided on 7- point semantic differential scales for three separate dimensions (i.e.,
validity, effectiveness, and overall strength) with three anchors (poor, average, excellent).
As can be seen in Appendix D, participants received an X on each dimension for each set
of arguments which varied in quality depending on whether they were placed in the high,
medium, or low condition. Participants received marks near the extreme high range of
the scale in the high thought confidence condition, just above average in the medium
15

thought confidence condition, and at the extreme low end of scale in the low thought
confidence condition.
Thought confidence manipulation check. The effectiveness of the
manipulation was checked by administering the “Response Inventory” to participants.
All items were reversed scored. Reliability of the scale was acceptable (α = .79). Using
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), participants were asked
to respond to the following 6 items:
•
•
•
•
•
•

I’m not certain that I am able to produce valid arguments about political
issues.
I’m not very confident in my thoughts about political issues.
I do not believe that my thoughts about politics are as valid as other
individuals.
I am not confident that my thoughts can help me overcome challenges to
my political beliefs.
I am not sure that my thoughts about the issues like the environment, gay
rights, and immigration are accurate.
I don’t have many valid thoughts to contribute to political issues.

In order to increase the plausibility of the feedback manipulation participants
were asked to complete a rating of a false participant’s arguments on the exact same
topics and dimensions on which they were rated to be provided as feedback for a future
participant (refer to Appendix F). These arguments were specifically constructed to be of
moderate quality and position. They were told that their own rated arguments were being
provided to them as an example of how to perform the task. Participants were also
advised that because all raters have been asked to rate the arguments as objectively based
on their quality and not their position, that they likewise should make their judgments
independent of their own leanings on the issue.

16

Normative pressure manipulation. Upon completion of the pre-discussion
measures, the participant was asked to join the four trained confederates in a conference
room for the political discussion. Prior to their arrival participants were randomly
assigned to be placed into discussion groups that either unanimously opposed their
position on gay rights or a control condition with one confederate advocating the
participants’ position but the majority still on the opposite side of the issue. Participants
were always positioned in the 4th seat at the conference table. Once seated, the
experimenter informed the group of the guidelines and format of the discussion.
Participants were informed that there would be a 3 voting sets and were instructed to vote
in the order of their seat (1-5). Participants were instructed to respond “yes,” “no,” or
“undecided.”
The first public voting section “MSU policies” was announced. Consistent with
the methodology employed by Asch (1956), the MSU policies voting set was designed
such that all of the members of the group should agree. This allowed the participants to
feel that they were a part of the group and served as a practice vote. Items included:
“Mississippi State University should initiate programs (like textbook rental, electronic
textbooks) to reduce the costs of textbooks,” “Mississippi State University needs to make
a concerted effort to increase the availability of parking on campus,” “Participation in the
University meal plan should be optional,” “The MSU library should increase the
availability of collections online,” and “The frequency and hours for the University
shuttle system needs to be increased.”
Next, a vote was taken on six gay rights issues to see if participants would
conform outright before even hearing the arguments of the confederates (Vote 1). Thus
17

votes on Vote 1 cannot be said to be a product of persuasion because there had not been
any attempt to offer arguments to persuade the participant. These voting issues mirrored
the 6 policy items assessed in the Political Positions Inventory with half worded pro-gay
rights and the other half worded anti-gay rights. The voting set included the following
items:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sexual orientation should be included in anti-discrimination laws (for
instance, it should be illegal to deny housing/ a job to someone based on
their sexual orientation.
Sexual orientation should be included as a protected class in hate crime
legislation.
There should be a law prohibiting same-sex marriage.
There should be laws restricting homosexuals from adopting.
Homosexuals should be prohibited from serving openly in the military.
Same-sex couples should be afforded the same benefits as heterosexual
couples (such as coverage under health insurance, hospital visitation rights
normally restricted to family, etc).

A 20-minute discussion on gay rights followed the first voting set. During the
discussion, confederates took positions advocating against the participants’ stance on gay
rights. The confederates were previously trained and rehearsed with a piloted list of
arguments for and against gay rights. After the discussion, the participant and the
confederates had a second public vote on the same six gay rights votes (Vote 2) to see if
participants conformed to the group norm after given the chance to defend their beliefs.
After the final vote participants were escorted to a private room where they were asked to
complete post discussion measures of valence and a “Final Word” attitude change
measure.
Post discussion valence of thoughts. Consistent with Petty, Brinol, and Tormala
(2002), the valence of thoughts generated in response to the group's persuasive message
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was measured to order evaluate the moderating influence of valence on thought
confidence and persuasion. Because the group discussion collectively served as the
persuasive argument in our study, participants were asked post-discussion to rate the
valence of their reactions to the arguments they were presented with in the group
discussion. The valence of participants’ thoughts about the discussion was measured
using four items found in the “Your Reactions” post-discussion questionnaire (refer to
Appendix G). Using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
participants responded to the following items: “Overall, I had a positive reaction to the
points others raised in the group,” “I felt good about the opinions expressed by the
group,” and “I found I felt negatively about what the group was saying,” “More often
than not I disliked what others in the group had to say,” which were reversed scored.
Reliability was good (α = .89).
Dependent Variables
Public indices: Conformity. Public conformity was determined by how often
the participant voted with the group on Vote 1 and Vote 2. A vote contrary to the
participant’s initial position was coded as active conformity. Thus, for every vote, of
which there were 12 (6 in Vote 1 + 6 in Vote 2), if participants voted with the group they
were assigned a score of “1” and a score of “0” if they voted against the group. If
participants indicated they were undecided they were assigned a score of “.5.” In the
present study, votes pre and post-discussion were correlated at r = .83 and were therefore
combined and averaged as overall scale of conformity.
Attitude change. Private attitude change was assessed using the “final word”
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questionnaire (refer to Appendix H). Direction of attitude change (DAC) was determined
by computing the difference between participants’ score on the 6 gay rights policy items
in the screening survey (Part 1) and their score on those same items completed postdiscussion (Part 2) in private. The post-test reliability of these items was good (α = .84).
Scores from Part 2 were subtracted from Part 1. Thus, a positive score indicates that the
participant became more pro-gay rights and a negative score indicates that the participant
became more anti-gay rights in their beliefs. A score of 0 = no attitude change. Scores
ranged from -5.33 to 5.17.
Debriefing. After completing the post-discussion measures, the experimenter
debriefed the participant to explain the experiment and answer any questions they may
have. Techniques adapted from Edlund, Sagarin, Skowronski, Johnson, and Kutter
(2009) were used to reduce and detect cross-talk.
Participant knowledge check. To test for participants’ knowledge of the
experiment a crosstalk test adapted from Edlund et al. (2009) was used. Participants were
presented with large jar of coins and were given the opportunity to guess how much
money was inside. They were told exact guesses would win them the contents. After
guessing, the experimenter informed them of the exact amount of money in the jar
($148.13).
In the event that the participant did guess the amount exactly, the experimenter
altered the “correct” amount slightly and made a note of the correct guess on the
participant’s paperwork. If a future participant “guessed” the correct amount this
indicated a high probability of prior knowledge about the experiment and the data from
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the participant was discarded. No participant guessed the correct amount so no data was
discarded from this experiment.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Analysis Procedure
The current study consisted of two parts. In Part 1, the participant’s initial
attitudes on gay rights were assessed using the Political Position Inventory. These
attitudes were then used to determine the participant’s initial position on gay rights (progay rights or anti-gay rights). In Part 2, thought confidence (high, medium, and low) and
normative pressure (unanimous or non-unanimous group opposition) were manipulated.
The dependent variables included conformity and directional attitude change.
Conformity rates were measured from public voting responses before and after a
discussion about gay rights and were combined and averaged for a total proportion of
conformity 2. Direction of attitude change was measured by computing a difference score
in attitudes from the Political Positions Inventory and “Final Word” attitude change
measure consisting of the same items.
It was hypothesized that participants who were initially anti-gay rights would
show more conformity and attitude change than those who were initially pro-gay rights.

2

A combined proportion of conformity scores were used because voting sets 1 and 2 were highly
correlated, r = .83. Separate regression analyses were run for voting sets 1 and 2 as voting set 1 was
considered a measure of pure conformity whereas voting set 2 can be said to contain aspects of persuasion
due to the arguments voiced during the discussion. However, the regression analyses were identical in
terms of the significant effects that emerged therefore conformity total was used as the final dependent
variable.
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It was also hypothesized that participants faced with unanimous group opposition would
show more conformity and norm consistent attitude change than participants who faced
non-unanimous group opposition (i.e., when a dissenting confederate is present). Finally,
it was hypothesized that people with lower confidence in their thoughts about gay rights
policies would show more public conformity and norm consistent attitude change than
those with higher confidence in their thoughts about gay rights policies, particularly when
they were initially anti-gay rights and facing unanimous group opposition. However,
participants’ valence in response to the group should moderate the effects of thought
confidence to the extent that where valence was negative and thought confidence was
high, conformity and attitude change would be reduced compared to when valence was
positive.
Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA failed to reveal any significant differences among the means
of the thought confidence manipulation groups [high (M = 5.32, SD = 1.23, n = 46),
medium (M = 4.90, SD = 1.26, n = 45 and low (M = 4.80, SD = 1.23, n = 45)], F (2, 133)
= 2.234, p = .111. Because the thought confidence manipulation failed to significantly
affect people’s self-reported thought confidence, the manipulation check items were
averaged and used as a continuous measure of thought confidence for hypothesis testing.
Preliminary Analyses
Descriptive statistics were generated to provide an overall assessment of where
participants stood on the dependent variables. Conformity scores could range from 0 (no
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conformity) to 1 (complete conformity). I found that, on average, participants conformed
50% of the time across voting sets 1 and 2.
Direction of attitude change scores could range from -6 to +6. A score of -6
represented maximum change from being pro-gay rights on the Political Positions
Inventory (e.g., “1”), to being anti-gay rights in post-test attitudes. A score of +6
represented maximum change from being anti-gay rights on the Political Positions
Inventory (e.g., “6”), to being pro-gay rights in post-test attitudes. A score of 0
represented no change. The mean direction of attitude change was slightly positive (M =
.38, SD = 1.72), indicating a slight shift toward pro-gay rights attitudes in the overall
sample. The analyses revealed no significant effects of gender or age and therefore these
demographic variables were excluded from subsequent analyses.
Because any differences in conformity or attitude change between those pro- and
anti-gay rights could be potentially attributed to differences in attitude extremity, a t test
was conducted to test for any differences in attitude extremity between those pro- and
anti-gay rights. Those who were initially pro-gay rights (M = 5.69, SD = .68) were not
significantly different in attitude extremity than those who were initially anti-gay rights
(M = 5.55, SD = .69), t(187) = 1.33, p = .186.
Hypothesis Testing
Hierarchical regression analyses were used to test how well participants’ gay
rights attitudes, normative pressure (unanimous opposition vs. non-unanimous
opposition), thought confidence, and valence predicted conformity and attitude change.
Separate regression analyses were run for each dependent variable. Although political
position was used dichotomously for condition assignment, participants’ initial gay rights
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attitudes were used as a continuous measure for hypothesis testing. Initial gay rights
attitudes, thought confidence, and valence scores were centered at the mean and
normative pressure was dummy coded (0 = non-unanimous opposition, 1 = unanimous
opposition). As recommended by Aiken and West (1991), individual predictors were
entered at Step 1, 2-way interactions at Step 2, 3-way interactions at Step 3, and 4-way
interactions at Step 4. For the regression analysis on conformity, no significant 4-way
interactions were found, thus step 4 was omitted from the final report. For the regression
analysis on attitude change, no significant 3 or 4-way interactions emerged, thus Steps 3
and 4 were omitted from the final report.
Conformity
The first dependent variable, conformity, was measured by how often participants
voted with the group, as opposed to voting according to their initial attitudes. After step
1, with individual predictors in the equation, R2 = .45. After step 2, with individual
predictors and 2-way interactions in the equation, R2 = .47. The change in variance
accounted for in step 2 (∆R2 = .020) was not significantly different than zero, F(4, 126) =
.016, p = .431. After step 3, with individual predictors, 2-way interactions, and 3-way
interactions in the equation, R2 = .50, F(11,123) = 11.22, p < .001. The change in
variance accounted for in step 3 (∆R2 = .036) was significantly different than zero, F(3,
123) = 2.987, p =.034. In the final regression model, significant effects of initial attitude,
normative pressure, thought confidence, and valence were found. A significant initial
attitude × thought confidence interaction was also found. Finally, a significant 3-way
initial attitude × normative pressure × thought confidence interaction was found. The
estimated unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and intercept, standard errors (SE),
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and estimated standardized regression coefficients (β) for the full regression model on
conformity are displayed in Table 1.
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.072

IA x NP x TC

.027

.021

.008

.014

.037

.017

.031

.014

.024

.044

.033

SE

STEP THREE

.236*

-.028

-.088

.039

.064

-.275*

-.038

.480***

-.259**

.303***

.460***

β

= .034, R2 = .50].

R2 = .45 for Step 1; R2 = .02 for Step 2; [F(4,126) = .016 , p = .431, R2 = .47]; R2 = .036 for Step 3 [F(3, 123) = 2.987, p

*p < .05 **p < .01, ***p < .001.

-.006

.006

.025

-.051

-.013

.103

-.068

.200

.101

b

NP x TC x Valence

.054

-.022

-.119

.038

.442***

-.217*

.356***

.403***

β

-.010

.010

.036

.013

.030

.014

.025

.043

.021

SE

STEP TWO

IA x TC x Valence

.009

TC x Valence

.095

-.009

.456***

-.057

IA x TC

.014

-.198**

.235

-.022

.098

Valence

.018

.355***

.088

b

IA x TC

-.052

Thought Confidence (TC)

.043

.384***

β

.013

.234

Normative Pressure (NP)

.015

SE

IA x NP

.084

b

Initial Attitude (IA)

VARIABLE

STEP ONE

Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Conformity

Table 1

Consistent with my first hypothesis, initial attitudes that were more anti-gay rights
were associated with greater conformity, (b = .101, SE = .033, β = .460). In fact,
analyzing conformity by participants’ initial position shows that, on average, pro-gay
rights participants conformed 39% of the time and anti-gay rights participants conformed
61% of the time. Consistent with hypothesis two, those who were placed into groups
where they faced unanimous opposition instead of non-unanimous opposition toward
their position on gay rights also showed increased public conformity, (b = .200, SE =
.044, β = .303). Those in the unanimous opposition group conformed 60% of the time
and those in the nonunanimous opposition group conformed 40% of the time. This
supports hypothesis two, which predicted that those facing unanimous normative pressure
would show more conformity.
As expected, lower levels of thought confidence were associated with greater
conformity, (b = -.068, SE = .024, β = -.259). The results also showed that to the extent
that participants had more positive reactions to what the group was saying, they showed
more conformity, (b = .103, SE = .014, β = .480). As indicated by the standardized
coefficients, valence had the strongest effect of any predictor (see Table 1). However,
contrary to expectations, participants’ valence in response the group failed to moderate
the effects of thought confidence. Rather, there was simply a main effect of valence,
such that the more positive the reaction to the persuasive message, the higher the
conformity.
An initial attitude × thought confidence interaction emerged but was ultimately
qualified by a thought confidence × initial attitude × normative pressure interaction. In
order to demonstrate whether thought confidence moderated the effects of normative
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pressure in both pro- and anti-gay rights people, separate regression analyses on
conformity were run for those pro- and anti-gay rights. A thought confidence ×
normative pressure interaction (b = .048, SE = .050, β = .132, p = .015), emerged in the
regression model for those who were anti-gay rights, but was non-significant in the
regression model for those who were pro-gay rights, (b = -.016, SE = 118, β = -.044, p =
.892). Values of the interaction term were plotted at +1/-1 SD and the means were
substituted in a simple linear regression equation (see Aiken & West, 1991). These were
then plotted to display the interaction. For those who were pro-gay rights in their initial
attitudes, unanimous normative pressure predicted higher levels of conformity but failed
to significantly interact with thought confidence (refer to Figure 2). In contrast, for those
who were anti-gay rights in their initial attitudes, higher levels of thought confidence
were associated with decreased conformity, particularly when exposed to unanimous
group opposition (refer to Figure 3).
Figure 2 indicates that, consistent with hypothesis 3, increased conformity was
shown in those who were initially more anti-gay rights, lower in thought confidence, and
facing unanimous normative pressure.
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Figure 2.

Non-significant Interaction Plot of Normative Pressure and Thought
Confidence on Conformity for Pro-Gay Rights Participants

Figure 3.

Significant Interaction Plot of Normative Pressure and Thought Confidence
for Anti-Gay Rights Participants on Conformity
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Attitude Change
My second dependent variable, attitude change, was assessed by computing a
difference score between participants’ pre-discussion responses to gay rights policies in
the screening survey with their response to the same items completed privately postdiscussion. For the analysis of attitude change, the effects of any variable beside
participants’ initial attitudes were expected to take the form of interactions due to the
expectation that pro- and anti-gay rights participants would change their attitudes in
opposite directions.
After step 1, with individual predictors in the equation, R2 = .13, F(4, 130) =
5.249, p < .001. A significant effect of initial attitudes was found in step 1. After step 2,
with individual predictors and 2-way interactions in the equation, R2 = .20, F(8, 126) =
3.96, p < .001. The change in variance explained between steps 1 and 2 was significant,
F(4, 126) = 2.432, p = .05. In the final regression model there was a significant effect of
initial attitudes and a significant thought confidence × group interaction. No other effects
or interactions emerged (refer to Table 2).
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Table 2
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Attitude Change
STEP ONE

STEP TWO

b

SE

β

b

SE

β

Initial Attitudes (IA)

.336

.096

.294*

.308

.134

.269*

Normative Pressure (NP)

.163

.282

.047

.178

.277

.052

Thought Confidence (TC) .228

.116

.166

-.050

.157

-.037

Valence

.091

.058

.061

.090

.054

IA x NP

.101

.193

.058

IA x TC

-.016

.086

-.016

NP x TC

.583

.229

.287*

TC x Valence

.070

.066

.085

VARIABLE

.065

*p < .05
R2 = .14 for Step 1; R2 = .062 for Step 2; [F(4,126) = 2.432, p = .05, R2 = .20].

Initial attitudes significantly predicted direction of attitude change, (b = .308, SE
= .134, β = .269). A t test was conducted to follow up on the significant effect of initial
attitudes in order to test whether the absolute value of attitude change scores were
significantly different for those pro- and anti-gay rights. Contrary to my first hypothesis,
those who were initially anti-gay rights (M = 1.43, SD = 1.16) did not show significantly
greater attitude change than those who were initially pro-gay rights (M = 1.20, SD =
1.12), t(186) = 1.43, p = .156 . Returning to the results of the regression, no main effects
of thought confidence or normative pressure were found due to diverging directions of
attitude change between those pro- and anti-gay rights. Consistent with the results for
conformity, valence did not moderate any significant interactions involving thought
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confidence. The predicted thought confidence × position × normative pressure
interaction was also non-significant. However, a thought confidence × normative
pressure interaction emerged in the final regression model. Because the effects of
directional attitude change are contingent upon position for interpretation, separate
regressions were run for those who were pro- and anti-gay rights. Results of these
regressions showed that a significant thought confidence × normative pressure interaction
(b = .958, SE = .377, β = .408, p = .014), emerged in the final regression model for antigay rights people, F(8, 56) = 3.219, p = .004, but was non-significant in the regression
using only pro-gay rights people (b = .309, SE = 682, β = .184, p = .653). As in the
previous analysis, I plotted values of the interaction term at +1/-1 SD and substituted the
means in a simple linear regression equation. These were then plotted to display the
interaction. Figure 4 shows that for those who were initially anti-gay rights, higher levels
of thought confidence led to more pro-gay rights attitudes when in the unanimous
opposition normative pressure condition but more anti-gay rights attitudes when in the
non-unanimous normative pressure condition. For those with lower levels of thought
confidence, rates of attitude change less affected by whether they were in unanimous or
non-unanimous opposition groups.
These results indicate that despite those low in thought confidence being more
likely to conform to the group, this greater conformity did not lead greater attitude
change post-discussion. Rather, increases in norm-consistent attitude change were
associated with higher levels of thought confidence, but only when facing unanimous
opposition. In contrast, when people with higher levels of thought confidence had an ally
to support their position, their attitudes polarized to further defy the group norm.
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Figure 4.

Interaction of Thought Confidence and Normative Pressure on Attitude
Change for Anti-Gay Rights Participants

Note: Figure represents attitude change in those anti-gay rights only. A negative
Direction of Attitude Change score represents an increase in anti-gay rights attitudes from
the Political Positions Inventory to the post-discussion. A positive Direction of Attitude
Change score represented change from being anti-gay rights on the Political Positions
Inventory to being pro-gay rights post-discussion. A Direction of Attitude Change score
of 0 represents no change in gay rights attitudes from Political Positions Inventory to
post-discussion.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

Overview of Research
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of social influence in shaping
people’s attitudes about gay rights policies. I first sought to replicate previous research
showing that social norms can affect both the public and private expression of policy
attitudes. In the current study, these social norms were operationalized as a unanimous
group norm which opposed the participant’s own position on gay rights. I was interested
in investigating whether different political policy orientations (i.e., for vs. against gay
rights) held different implications for their owners’ response to the opposing group.
Specifically, I was interested in whether those expressing anti-gay rights policy attitudes
to an egalitarian group would show less resistance than those expressing pro-gay rights
attitudes to a non-egalitarian group.
I was also interested in examining how individual differences at the metacognitive level of thinking (i.e., assessment of one’s thoughts) could provide an increased
understanding of why individuals respond differently to the pressures of social influence.
In the current study I was particularly interested in whether individuals’ confidence in the
validity of their thoughts about gay rights would lead more or less susceptibility to
conformity and norm consistent attitude change when exposed to a group norm in
opposition of their stance on gay rights.
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Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Initial position. Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants who were initially
against gay rights would show more conformity and norm-consistent attitude change than
those who were initially pro-gay rights. Consistent with hypothesis 1, I found that people
who were more anti-gay rights tended to conform more than those who were more progay rights in their initial attitudes. In regards to conformity, I found that overall, those
who were initially categorized as anti-gay rights conformed 61% of the time compared to
39% of the time for those who were initially categorized as pro-gay rights. On the other
hand, participants’ initial attitudes did not significantly affect norm-consistent attitude
change. Rather, people in current study, whether pro-and anti-gay rights, tended to shift
their attitudes in the direction of the opposing group.
Normative pressure. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants exposed to group
norms with unanimous opposition would show more conformity to the group norm and
more norm consistent attitude change. Consistent with hypothesis 2, results showed that
participants were who placed in a discussion group with complete solidarity, as opposed
to a group with a single dissenter, showed increased public conformity. However, as will
be described next, the effect of normative pressure on attitude change was moderated by
the participants’ initial position and thought confidence.
Thought confidence. My third hypothesis predicted that people with low thought
confidence would show more conformity and norm consistent attitude change. I also
expected that thought confidence would moderate the effect of position and normative
pressure such that those anti-gay rights and/or facing unanimous normative pressure
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would be particularly susceptible to conformity and attitude change when low in thought
confidence. Further, I expected that the inclusion of participants’ valence (positive or
negative) of thoughts in response to the discussion might moderate certain effects of
thought confidence. This prediction was based on research showing that positive valence
in response to a persuasive message weakens the resistance to persuasion of thought
confidence. However, in the current study valence failed to interact with thought
confidence. Therefore, participants’ valence in response to the group, whether positive
or negative, was not needed to observe the effects of thought confidence. However,
participants’ valence in response to the group proved to be a significant predictor of
whether or not people conformed to the group with more positive valence predicting
increased conformity to the opposing group.
Consistent with hypothesis three, I found that lower thought confidence was
associated with increased conformity whereas higher thought confidence was associated
with decreased conformity, particularly when people were more anti-gay rights in their
initial attitudes. These effects were qualified by a significant 3-way interaction between
political position, thought confidence, and normative pressure, but only in those who
were anti-gay rights. For people who were anti-gay rights, lower thought confidence was
associated with increased conformity, particularly when placed in the unanimous
normative pressure condition.
Regarding directional attitude change, thought confidence better predicted attitude
change in those who were initially anti-gay rights and in who thought confidence was
higher. For those who were more anti-gay rights but lower in thought confidence, they
actually maintained their original attitudes, regardless of whether normative pressure was
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unanimous or non-unanimous. Furthermore, the effects of thought confidence varied
depending on the amount of normative pressure present in the voting sets and discussion.
Higher thought confidence resulted in polarized attitudes for anti-gay rights people
placed in groups with non-unanimous opposition. In contrast, higher thought confidence
predicted more norm consistent attitude change when anti-gay rights people faced nonunanimous group opposition. Thus, the results of attitude change partially support
hypothesis three. In general, high thought confidence was expected to provide greater
resistance compared to low thought confidence. High thought confidence only reduced
attitude change when normative pressure was non-unanimous. When normative pressure
was unanimous, anti-gay rights people with higher thought confidence actually showed
norm consistent attitude change whereas anti-gay rights people with lower thought
confidence maintained their original attitudes.
To summarize, those who were lower in thought confidence showed increased
conformity compared to those higher in thought confidence, particularly when their
attitudes were more anti-gay rights. However, higher conformity for those lower in
thought confidence did not translate into greater attitude change as those with lower
thought confidence tended to maintain their initial attitudes, regardless of normative
pressure. Instead, higher levels of thought confidence were associated with norm
consistent attitude change, particularly when initial attitudes were more anti-gay rights.
Anti-gay rights attitudes were associated with norm-consistent attitude change when the
opposition of the group was unanimous. However, when the group featured an anti-gay
rights ally, anti-gay rights attitudes were associated with attitude polarization (i.e.,
attitudes became even more anti-gay rights).
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Limitations
Before providing broader interpretations of my results I will first acknowledge the
potential caveats of my study. My study was conducted at Mississippi State University,
in a state that may be perceived to have a state level norm that is largely anti-gay rights.
Although the anti-gay rights position was actually a slight minority (48%) in the current
sample, it would be interesting to conduct this experiment in a political climate that was
overwhelmingly pro-gay rights. In my study, pro-gay rights individuals may have more
easily adhered to their beliefs because they are accustomed to perceiving themselves as a
holding a minority position, and may have developed counter-arguments to inoculate
themselves against persuasion attempts (see McGuire, 1964). However, the different
rates of conformity and attitude changes for those pro- and anti-gay rights might also be
explained by one of the underlying theoretical assumptions of the current study, namely
that the egalitarian group norm is stronger than the non-egalitarian norm.
The failure to successfully manipulate thought confidence is also a limitation of
the current study. Given that I was only able to use thought confidence measured postmanipulation in my analyses I am unable to claim a causal impact of thought confidence
on conformity and attitude change. However, Petty, Brinol, and Tormala (2002) found
the same effects for thought confidence regardless of whether thought confidence was
measured or manipulated. Nonetheless, it is recognized that the greatest possible control
over the thought confidence variable would be the most desirable situation. In order to
more systematically establish the role of thought confidence in resistance to social norms,
particularly as it pertains to policy relevant social norms, it is recommended that a
stronger manipulation of thought confidence be developed.
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Although thought confidence predicted resistance and susceptibility to conformity
in certain cases, its effects on attitude change were not entirely as expected. The lack of
any effects of valence and thought confidence together makes interpretation of thought
confidence in the current study somewhat difficult. Research on the self-validation
hypothesis would seem to suggest that high thought confidence would reduce the effect
that normative pressure had on increasing persuasion. A positive valence in response to
the pro-gay rights message would have helped explain why an anti-gay rights participant
would change their attitudes in the direction of the group, despite having confidence in
their own thoughts about gay rights. However, valence proved not to be a deciding factor
in the effects of thought confidence.
In the current study the effects of thought confidence functioned somewhat
differently than in previous research as it pertained to private attitudes. Perhaps these
differences highlight the importance of studying thought confidence in a variety of
situations. The results suggest that thought confidence might function differently in a
dynamic and challenging social situation. When normative pressure was strongest, high
thought confidence seemed to provide an over assurance of one’s abilities that only
increased susceptibility to persuasion. Under weaker normative pressure and with a peer
example of how to withstand persuasion, high thought confidence seemed to behave as
expected when it came to attitudes.
Social Norms and Intergroup Policy Attitudes
Research has found that that people readily adhere to social norms when
expressing prejudice. In fact, Crandall, Eshleman, & O’ Brien (2002) found a .96
correlation between people’s reported level of prejudice and their perceptions of the
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normative acceptability of prejudice. If biased policy attitudes have become a vessel for
the expression of prejudice, then people should be reluctant to report them when the
social norm is egalitarian. In the current study, when faced with a social norm that
opposed their position, those who were anti-gay rights showed more conformity whereas
those pro-gay rights more readily expressed their genuine beliefs. The group norm
seemed to convey to anti-gay rights people that the expression of negative intergroup
attitudes was not acceptable.
The effects of initial attitudes may also indicate that the strength of social norms
advocating for or against gay rights might vary. Several researchers have argued that
social influence is more powerful when the position being advocated is perceived as
being consistent with the larger norm or potentially becoming the more popular opinion
(Clark & Maass, 1990; Glynn et al., 1997; Shamir, 1997). The pro-gay rights position
fits the larger societal norm. National polling shows that advocates for certain gay rights
initiatives – e.g., benefits (74%), equal employment (88%), and gays in the military
(69%) – are now in the national majority and attitude towards homosexuals have become
less negative over the last three decades (see Gallup.com). The momentum that tolerance
seems to have over intolerance could help to explain why the United States continues to
move toward more egalitarian policy attitudes. If the power of pro-and anti-gay rights
messages were equivalent then one would expect gay rights attitudes to show little
change as it would be difficult for any given group to gain any ground. Instead, there
seems to be indications that acceptance of gay rights will win out as those who endorse
egalitarian values hold their ground while swaying the opinions of those who are
opposed.
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Majority vs. Minority Influence
Although it appears that social norms may be more effective when confronting
social injustices than when maintaining or fostering them, it is important to consider how
interrupting the solidarity of these social norms can decrease their efficacy. When
participants were placed in groups that featured a confederate acting as a dissenter voting
and arguing consistently pro- or anti-gay rights, participants were more likely to vote
consistent with their pre-existing attitudes. One possible explanation why the dissenter
confederate bolstered the participants’ resistance to conformity is that it reduced the
numerical size of the majority (from 4 to 3) and thereby reduced the group’s ability to
exert as much social influence on the participant. This is consistent with mathematical
models of majority influence forwarded by Clark and Maass (1990). However, it seems
unlikely that effects of normative pressure are simply due to the numerical size of the
majority. The confederate acting as a dissenter may have reduced participants’
perception of group solidarity by disrupting the sequence of unanimous voting opposite
the participants’ position. Another consideration is that the dissenting confederate may
have served as an example of non-conformity to the participant. Essentially, the presence
of a dissenter not only reminds people that standing up to the group permissible but
emboldens them to do so themselves.
The minority dissenter might have been particularly effective in reducing the
influence of the majority because she/he was forwarding arguments largely consistent
with that of the participant. Thus, the dissenter not only disrupts the social norm but
brings into focus arguments that are consistent with the participant’s initial position. The
presence of a likeminded individual in the group may have given participants the
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opportunity to engage in confirmation bias, or the tendency to favor arguments that are
consistent with one’s own beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). In the current study participants
were given the opportunity to selectively attend to validating arguments voiced by the
minority dissenter in the non-unanimous normative pressure condition. Therefore it is
not surprising that the minority dissenter reduced the social influence of the majority.
However, the effects of normative pressure alone did not have a significant effect
on people’s private attitudes. It is important to note that this is consistent with
expectations that, due to the use of directional attitude change, main-effects other than
initial position would not be detectable. As I will discuss in the next section, whether or
not individuals changed their attitudes based on the level of normative pressure present in
the discussion depended on their amount of thought confidence.
Thought Confidence and Resistance to Social Norms
People who had low levels of confidence in their thoughts about gay rights
showed more conformity to the group than those who had high thought confidence.
Unexpectedly, when accounting for initial attitudes, thought confidence didn’t appear to
affect rates of conformity in those who were more pro-gay rights. For those who were
more anti-gay rights, however, the highest rates of conformity where found in those with
lower thought confidence. As predicted, having higher thought confidence significantly
decreased conformity rates in both the unanimous and non-unanimous opposition groups.
This suggests that having higher confidence in one’s thoughts behind one’s anti-gay
rights attitudes provides some degree of increased resistance to going along with the
group. However, people who lack confidence in the validity these thoughts appear more
likely to go along with the group.
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These findings merit discussion about what thought confidence might represent.
As operationalized in the present study, it was manipulated by providing validation or
invalidation through peer feedback. In other thought confidence research, confidence has
been manipulated by telling people whether their beliefs are consistent or inconsistent
with a majority (Petty, Brinol, & Tormala, 2002). It seems likely that thought confidence
has significant overlap with the perceived social acceptance of one’s beliefs. Consistent
with the sociometer hypothesis (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), self-confidence
is argued to be a barometer of social acceptance of the self. In the experimental portion
of the current study, participants were basically in one of three primary conditions. In
one, they received feedback conveying that their thoughts were rejected by all or most of
their peers (low thought confidence conditions, either normative pressure condition). In
another, they were in a situation where a group of peers directly challenged, probably
unexpectedly, their pre-discussion peer-validation their thoughts (in the high confidence,
unanimous condition). Otherwise, they were in a situation where three peers rejected
their thoughts and one reinforced the validation of the pre-discussion peer evaluations,
potentially reminding them only minutes ago they’d had the endorsement of an additional
two peers (in the high confidence, non-unanimous confidence). In essence, the ally in the
discussion made the peer breakdown 3 vs. 3 because the false feedback featured two
endorsers. Accordingly, thought confidence may in part serve as a metric of social
acceptance of one’s beliefs. However, high confidence is needed for change in beliefs to
occur when one learns that one’s thoughts are rejected. When confidence in one’s
thoughts is depleted, it may mean that individuals don’t know what to believe and don’t
have sufficient confidence validity in their thoughts to take a stance either side of the
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issue. Similar findings exist within self-esteem literature with regard to resiliency in the
face of adversity (Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993).
As for valence, it did not interact with confidence in a way that had been found
previously. Participants’ valence in response to the group proved to be the most robust
correlate of conformity in the current study. Although valence by itself was not of
primary theoretical interest in the current study, the large effect size found of valence
merits a further interpretation. People who reported more positive valence in their
thoughts about the arguments of the opposing group tended to show increased
conformity. Essentially, people who like what was said by the opposing group tended to
vote in line with the group in public. However, because valence was assessed postdiscussion, it could also be said that to the extent that people showed increased
conformity, they tended to report more positive valence in their thoughts about the group.
This makes the causal role of valence difficult to parse and raises the question of whether
valence predicts conformity or conformity predicts liking.
It is important to note that the relationship between valence and conformity was
found in both sets of conformity scores. In the initial vote on gay rights, which can be
said to be a pure measure of conformity, no arguments were voiced on the part of the
confederates. Therefore, rates of conformity should be unaffected by valence in the
initial voting set. Because a significant relationship was found for valence and
conformity, it could be that increases in conformity during the voting sets were associated
with an increase in positive valence. One reason for that conformity may result in more
positive valence is cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is an aversive state that
arises when one holds two or more inconsistent cognitions. In order to reduce this
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aversive state, people change their attitudes or behaviors to achieve a state of cognitive
consistency (Festinger, 1957). In current study, people who conformed may have
experienced cognitive dissonance by voting contrary to their private attitudes. In order to
reduce the dissonance created by conforming, they may have shifted their attitudes about
the other members in the group become more positive. By reporting a positive valence in
their thoughts about the group, they may have been able to justify voting with the group
by giving positive evaluations of what was said by others in the discussion.
As with conformity, thought confidence only predicted attitude change in those
who were initially more anti-gay rights in their attitudes. The relationship between
thought confidence and normative pressure for attitudes was more complex than that of
conformity in that attitudes only changed among those allegedly confident in their
thoughts. The results suggest that depending on the strength of the normative pressure,
high thought confidence can either increase or decrease norm-consistent attitude change.
When normative pressure was non-unanimous, higher thought confidence actually made
anti-gay rights individuals’ more extreme in their post discussion attitudes. When
normative pressure was unanimous, people with higher thought confidence became more
pro-gay rights, changing with the norm.
This is inconsistent with expectations that, in general, high thought confidence
should result in decreased norm-consistent attitude change. Yet, it is also inconsistent
with expectations that conformity should predict subsequent attitudes. After all, the
group who showed the highest rates of conformity (anti-gay rights and low in thought
confidence) showed no attitude change whereas those with high thought confidence
resisted conforming yet changed their attitudes under high normative pressure. One
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possible explanation is that, for those with high thought confidence, the unanimous
normative pressure resulted in a violation of their expectations regarding social support.
It is possible that these individuals had higher expectations of social support regarding
their beliefs prior to the discussion and having these expectations violated might have
lead to increased attitude change.
Research on vicarious dissonance theory has demonstrated that when people view
a fellow in-group member behavior counter-attitudinally they experience vicarious
cognitive dissonance and change their attitudes (Monin, Norton, Cooper, & Hogg, 2004;
Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003). Anti-gay rights people in the high thought
confidence conditions may have experienced vicarious dissonance by observing pro-gay
rights attitudes in a group that they expected to be largely anti-gay rights. Thus, shifting
their own attitudes to match ingroup may have been the easiest way for these individuals
to reduce any dissonance resulting from the discussion. In contrast, it appeared that when
at least one ally was present, anti-gay rights people were able to use the dissenting group
member as a buffer to any vicarious cognitive dissonance. Thus, depending on the
solidarity of the opposing majority, high thought confidence can either reverse or
enhance the effects of social influence. When participants find that the high confidence
behind their thoughts is unjustified, it may be that the higher their confidence the harder
they fall.
Directions for Further Research
The results of this study clearly demonstrated that those who are pro-gay rights
are more resistant to conforming in the face of an opposing social norm. It is important
to better understand why individuals who were pro-gay rights were less sensitive to social
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influence than those who were anti-gay rights. In the future, certain individual
differences might be considered (e.g., need for cognition, right-wing authoritarianism,
social dominance orientation) which might account for any inherent individual
differences between those pro- and anti-gay rights.
There are likely certain aspects about the situation presented in the current study
that are important in understanding why pro and anti people differed. The perception that
the larger social norm is pro-gay rights might have made it easier for pro-gay rights
participants to avoid conformity. Measuring the extent to which participants perceive a
stance on gay rights as being consistent with larger societal norm could be an important
step in understanding why anti-gay rights were more susceptible to the group pressure in
this study. It is important to consider how the consequences of non-conformity might
differ for those who are pro- and anti-gay rights. Deviance Regulation Theory (DRT;
Blanton & Christie, 2003) posits that people engage in conformity to avoid negative
consequences of non-conformity. However, it is also posited that when positive
consequences of non-conformity exist, people engage in uniqueness striving. It seems
reasonable that given the larger societal norm is becoming more egalitarian in regards to
gay rights, pro-gay rights people can frame non-conformity to an anti-gay rights norm in
a more positive way than the converse. Employing theoretical frame works like DRT
might help future research demonstrate whether any differences in the social motives for
non-conformity exist for those pro- and anti-gay rights.
In the current study, it was expected that thought confidence would assist in
explaining why pro- and anti-gay rights individuals conformed less to social influence.
Although thought confidence proved to be useful in understanding how people respond
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differently to social influence, the effects of thought confidence were less comprehensive
than hoped. For those who were pro-gay rights, thought confidence did not appear to
alter their response to the strength of the normative pressure of the group. This does not
necessarily mean that thought confidence does not play a role in the attitudes of those
who are pro-gay rights. Rather, it is possible that to the extent that they are more pro-gay
rights, the perceived validity of their own thoughts about their political attitudes might be
less relevant when navigating social norms than for people who are more anti-gay rights.
In fact, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) have demonstrated that conservatives are more
likely to endorse group binding moral foundations (i.e., morality based on ingroup and
authority) than liberals. If thought confidence is a metric of social acceptance of beliefs,
then pro people may be more accustomed to disregarding information about the social
acceptance of their beliefs due to differing moral values. Therefore, understanding the
role of meta-cognitive processes such as thought confidence across different types of
individuals and in various social domains is an important task for future research. This is
particularly true given past research on thought confidence has been conducted in a
narrow range of situations.
Conclusion
The current study demonstrates how expressions of negative intergroup attitudes
and privately held policy beliefs can be altered through social influence. Contrary to the
perception of intractability between liberal and conservative viewpoints, this study
demonstrated that even a small group can alter attitudes towards social justice policies. It
appears that the egalitarian social norm may have a greater degree of efficacy in initiating
conformity than the biased norm. Most importantly, confidence in the thoughts that
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underlie anti-gay rights attitudes may not necessarily be a barrier achieving egalitarian
attitudes on gay rights, particularly when challenges to these beliefs are leveraged with a
social norm that is high in solidarity.
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Political Psychology Project Consent Form
You are invited to participate in a research study examining the syntax and style of political
discussions. Please read this form and ask any questions you may have before participating in
this study.
Background Information:
This study focuses on the subjects and styles of political discussions. Current knowledge on
group discussions centers on face-to-face contact and this study hopes to expand on that
knowledge by using a variety of topics. This is a preliminary survey that will narrow future
possible topics for later testing on political views. We are interested in your personal views, your
reasons for these views, and your reactions to others’ views.
Procedure:
If you agree to this study, you will first be asked to complete a survey including questionnaires
assessing your feelings towards different political beliefs, personality, and values (e.g., religious,
moral, American). The survey usually takes 60 minutes to complete. You are encouraged to ask
any questions you might have. After completing the survey, you will be asked to return to the lab
within 2 months to participate in a face-to-face group political discussion. This discussion will
take between approximately 85 minutes, depending on topic and discussion.
Risks of Participating:
In this study, you may be exposed to topics or viewpoints that you disagree with or make you feel
uncomfortable. Although these topics are frequently discussed in the media and within political
debates, you might wish to avoid these possibly controversial subjects. You may elect to skip any
item in the survey and you are welcome to withdraw from this study at any time, including during
the discussion, without incurring a penalty (e.g., you will be awarded your point as if you had
completed that part of the research study). We cannot guarantee whether you will get along or
even like the people with whom you are having a discussion. If, at any time, the discussion
makes you feel uncomfortable, please notify the discussion moderator and you can withdraw. If
any unpleasant feelings are raised during this study, you are encouraged to contact the University
Counseling Center at 662-325-2091.
Compensation:
You will receive one credit for completing the survey and 1.5 credits in the Psychology Research
Program for participating in the political discussion.
Confidentiality:
The records of this study will be kept private and only researchers will have access to these
records. If any portion of this study is published, no identifying information about the
participants will be included. Participants will be assigned a code number to facilitate tracking
across separate parts of the study. This code number will be written on an appointment card at
the conclusion of part one of the study. Participants should bring that card with them to the lab
upon their return for part two at which point appointment cards will be discarded. During the
discussion, the conversation will be recorded for later coding. At no time will you be identified
(and it is recommended that you do not provide identifying information to your co-discussants)
other than with an identification of Participant#_.” For the face-to-face discussion, the session
will be audio-recorded, your voice and seat number are the only identifiers, and these recordings
will be destroyed after transcription (or within a period of 5 years).
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Voluntary Nature of the Study:
Your decision whether or not to participate in this study is voluntary and will not affect your
current or future relationship with Mississippi State University or any person associated with the
university. Even if you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at anytime with no penalty.
Contact and Questions:
The researchers conducting this study are Dr. Colleen Sinclair and Benjamin Walker. You may
ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact them at (662) 3255108. For additional information regarding human participation in research, please feel free to
contact the MSU Regulatory Compliance Office at (662) 325-3994. You will be given a copy of
this form to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent:
I have read and understand the above information. I acknowledge I am at least 18 years of age
and I consent to my participation in this study. By signing here, I further acknowledge that am
aware that my participation in this study will earn me credits in the Psychology Research
Program. I am also aware that there are alternative ways of earning class credit.
Signature _______________________________ Date ____________
Signature of Investigator ___________________ Date ____________
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Political Positions Inventory

CODE #:____________

A. Please start by completing the following demographic information about yourself:
Gender: __________________

Age: ____________ Religion:

_____________________
26. Using the following scale please indicate:

27.

a. Never
b. Rarely (Once or twice a year)
c. Only on holidays
week)
d. Occasionally (at least 6 times a year)
e. Monthly (at least once a month)

f. Bi-weekly (at least twice a month)
g. Weekly (at least once a week)
h. Frequently (more than once a
i. Very frequently (Daily)
j. More than once a day

28. How often do you attend church/temple/synagogue?: _____________
How often do you pray privately in places other than a place of worship?: ____________
How often do you watch or listen to religious programs on TV or radio?: ____________
How often do you read the Bible or other religious literature?: __________
How often are prayers or grace said before or after meals in your home?: ___________
29. Race/Ethnicity: circle all that apply

a.
b.
c.
d.

African-American, Black
Middle Eastern, Arabic
Pacific Islander
Asian-American, Asian

30. Political Affiliation

a. Republican
b. Democrat
c. Green Party

31. Sexual Orientation

e. Hispanic
f. Caucasian, White
g. American Indian
h. Other
d. Independent
e. Libertarian
f. Socialist
g. Other, Specify:
_________________

a. Heterosexual
b. Homosexual
c. Bisexual

d. Asexual
e. Questioning
f. Other

Did you vote in the 2008 Presidential Election (Circle one)?
YES
NO
UNSURE
Ineligible to vote
If yes, who did you vote for? If not who would you have voted for (Circle One)?
John McCain
Barack Obama
Other: _____________
UNSURE
Have you ever used Instant Messaging?:

YES
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NO

If yes, how often do you use instant messaging?
a. More than once a day
b. Daily
c. Every other day
d. Weekly
e. Monthly
f. Bi-monthly
g. Every few months or so
h. Yearly
Political Positions Inventory: Please use the scale provided to respond to the following items
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Neutral Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree

1. Restrictions on American businesses in the name of “protecting the environment” are
harming/inhibiting the nation’s economy.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2. Building a stronger military should be a national priority.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3. Homosexuals use their sexual orientation so they can obtain special privileges
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
4. The United States should attempt to retrieve oil wherever it can.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5. A woman should have the right to choose whether or not to receive an abortion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6. Homosexuals seem to focus on the ways in which they differ from heterosexuals, and ignore the
ways in which they are the same
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7. Legislation like Arizona’s immigration reform law should be adopted throughout the country.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8. The death penalty is a fair consequence of extreme criminal action.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9. Homosexuals do not have all the rights they need
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
10. The United States should not be involved in “nation building” in other countries.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
11. Many illegal drugs should be made legal.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
12. People make too much of a big deal global warming.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
13. The government needs to make a concerted effort to protect our border from illegal immigrants.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
14. Homosexuals should be allowed to marry, legally.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
15. The media devotes far too much attention to the topic of homosexuality.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
16. Giving immigrants increased rights will only increase illegal immigration.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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17. Celebrations such as “Gay Pride Day” are ridiculous because they assume that an individual’s
sexual orientation should constitute a source of pride
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
18. Certain areas should be protected from oil exploration.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
19. Homosexuals still need to protest for equal rights
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
20. The government should lower military spending.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
21. The recent tax cuts have only benefited upper-class citizens.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
22. Homosexuals should stop shoving their lifestyle down other people’s throats
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
23. Hiring minorities in order to increase diversity is a ridiculous idea.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
24. Sexual orientation should be included as a protected class in anti-discrimination policies.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
25. Individuals wrongly sentenced to death should receive financial reparations.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
26. If homosexuals want to be treated like everybody else, then they need to stop making such a fuss
about their sexuality/culture.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
27. The United States should focus more money on finding renewable energy sources.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
28. Just because a person is a homosexual, it does not mean that person has a mental disorder.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
29. The war in Iraq was necessary and justified.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
30. Homosexuals should have the same rights as heterosexuals.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
31. Abstinence-only sex education programs are really the only sex education we need.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
32. The United States desperately needs stricter gun control laws.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
33. Sexual orientation should be included as a protected class in anti-hate crime laws.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
34. The United States should have never declared war on Iraq.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
35. Affirmative Action is a positive step towards ending discrimination against minorities.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
36. Homosexuals should stop complaining about the way they are treated and simply get on with
their lives.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
37. The Patriot Act helps protect Americans from future terrorist attacks.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
38. We should remove the Supreme Court restrictions prohibiting the execution of individuals with
impaired decision-making abilities (e.g., those with lower IQs, those with mental illnesses, and
persons 18 and under).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
39. Marijuana use should be illegal.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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40. Homosexuals should be able to adopt children.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
41. The death penalty should be outlawed, as it is never right to take a life.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
42. The government should control health care, not private companies.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
43. The armed forces are right to exclude homosexuals from military service.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
44. We should reduce the number of appeals (and thus the cost) that a death row inmate is permitted
before execution.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
45. Abortion should always be illegal, regardless of the circumstances of the conception.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
46. Homosexuals have become confrontational in their demand for rights
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
47. Feminists are making unreasonable demands of men.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
48. Assisted suicide for terminally ill patients should be legalized.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
49. Anti-discrimination policies give certain groups special rights and advantages over others.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
50. All Americans should receive affordable healthcare.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
51. Policies addressing sex discrimination are unnecessary in this day and age.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
52. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being
discriminated against.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
53. Illegal immigration is a serious threat to our national security.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
54. Racial profiling is an acceptable practice.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
55. Feminists are seeking for women to have more power than men.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
56. It is important to conserve energy.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
57. Pregnant women who endanger the lives of their babies by smoking or drinking while pregnant
should be prosecuted.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
58. Employers should provide health care benefits to the partners of their gay and lesbian employees.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
59. The separation of church and state has resulted in a moral decline in our society.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
60. More restrictions need to be set up to protect the environment.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
61. Gays and lesbians who adopt children need to be monitored more closely than heterosexual
parents.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
62. Under current sexual harassment policies, most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as
being sexist.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

63

63. I would vote for an openly homosexual candidate.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
64. Anti-discrimination policies are not really needed nowadays.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
65. Abortions during the third trimester should be banned.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
66. Welfare should be abolished.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
67. Birth control means - such as the pill and condoms - should be made freely available to people in
clinics.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
68. Small family farms should receive more federal financial support.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
69. Given many American businesses (e.g., farms, fisheries) depend on seasonal labor, we should
increase the number of seasonal work visas we grant to immigrants (currently limited to 50,000 for
the entire United States).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
70. The death penalty, if used at all, should only be used in murder cases where DNA evidence
confirms defendant responsibility.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
71. More money should be invested into groups like "The Innocence Project" that works to free the
wrongly convicted.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
72. The exporting of American jobs to foreign countries is a big problem in the U.S.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
73. The recently passed immigration law in Arizona, which allows police officers to demand proof of
citizenship from those they suspect are illegal immigrants, is a form of racial profiling.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
74. The government extends too many benefits to big businesses.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
75. Many people do not do enough to conserve energy.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
76. There are too many restrictions on businesses all done in the name of “protecting the
environment.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
77. Including a public option allowing any American to opt-into Federal health insurance programs
(like Medicare) is a bad idea.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
78. The Freedom of Access to Abortion Clinics Act prohibiting protesters from "harassing" or
blocking entrance to abortion clinics should be repealed.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
79. We need to expand the means for immigrants to be able to enter the country legally.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
80. The decision to end a life supported by life support equipment should be allowed to be made by
one’s family.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
81. The FDA approval of over-the-counter sale of the Morning After pill is a positive move.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
82. The best way to increase the health of the economy is to allow corporations to operate without
the intrusion of the government.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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83. The rape of a child should be punishable by death.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
84. The recent healthcare reform was a big mistake.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
85. Government bailouts of large corporations are ultimately in the best interest of the economy.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
86. Every American child should have access to Medicare, like the elderly, if not otherwise insured.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
87. Children born in the United States to illegal immigrants should not be recognized as U.S. citizens.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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This form contains ratings of the written thoughts you provided in part 1 of this study.
Ratings were provided by randomly chosen participant coders and rated on the following
three dimensions.
•
•
•

Validity is the degree to which an argument is free from logical flaws, compelling, rational, and
well reasoned.
Effectiveness is meant to reflect the degree to which the rater found the arguments convincing,
persuading them to potentially agree.
Finally, raters were asked to rate the overall strength of the arguments which is meant to convey
how strong the argument is using all of the previous criteria and any other criteria the rater deemed
relevant.

Rater 1

Validity

x
Poo
r

Poo
r

Rater 2

THE ENVIRONMENT
Averag
e

Excelle
nt

Poo
r

Excelle
nt

x
Poo
r

Effectiveness

x

Averag
e
Overall Strength

x
Poo
r

Averag
e

Excelle
nt

Poo
r

THE ENVIRONMENT
x

Excelle
nt

Poo
r

Excelle
nt

x
Poo
r

Excelle
nt

x
Poo
r

Effectiveness

x
Poo
r

Averag
e
Overall Strength

x
Poo
r

Averag
e

Averag
e
x

x

Poo
r

Poo
r
x
Poo
r

x

Excelle
nt

x
Poo
r

Excelle
nt

x
Poo
r

Effectiveness
Averag
e
Overall Strength
Averag
e

Overall Strength
Averag
e

Excelle
nt

Validity
Averag
e

Excelle
nt

Averag
e

Excelle
nt

Overall Strength
Averag
e

Excelle
nt

IMMIGRATION

Validity
Averag
e

Excelle
nt

Effectiveness

IMMIGRATION
x

Excelle
nt

GAY RIGHTS

Validity
Averag
e

Averag
e
Effectiveness

GAY RIGHTS
x
Poo
r

Validity

Excelle
nt

Poo
r
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Validity
Averag
e

Excelle
nt

Effectiveness
Averag
e
x

Excelle
nt

Overall Strength
Averag
e

Excelle
nt
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Response Inventory

Sometimes, in discussions, we find the different personalities are related to different types sets of
beliefs. If you could please take a moment to complete the following questions, we’d appreciate
it. Thank you. Using the scale provided, please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statement:

1

2

3

Strongly
Disagree

4

5

6

7

Unsure

Strongly
Agree

1. I’m not certain that I am able produce valid arguments about political issues.
1
2
3
2. At times I think I’m no good at all.
3.

4

5

6

1
2
3
4
5
I’m not very confident in my thoughts about political issues.

1
2
3
4
5
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

7
6

7

6

7

1
2
3
4
5
6
5. I’ve been pretty successful in debates and political discussions.

7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6. I do not believe that my thoughts about politics are as valid as others individuals.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7. I am not confident that my thoughts can help me overcome challenges to my political
beliefs.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8. Even when others get discouraged, I know I can find a way to solve the problem.
9.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I am not sure that my thoughts about the issues like the environment, gay rights, and
immigration are accurate.

1
2
3
10. I am easily defeated in an argument.

4

5

6

7

1
2
3
4
5
6
11. When my beliefs are tested, I lose confidence in my thoughts.

7

1
2
3
4
12. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

7

5

6

1
2
3
4
5
6
13. I don’t have many valid thoughts to contribute to political issues.
1
2
3
4
5
6
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This part of the experiment will have you acting as a participant coder. The following form is a
randomly selected transcription of a participant’s written responses from part 1 of this study. We
are interested in how people might evaluate spoken arguments differently than written arguments.
Please evaluate the participant’s responses on the following dimensions.
• Validity is the degree to which an argument is free from logical flaws, compelling,
rational, and well reasoned.
• Effectiveness is meant to reflect the degree to which the rater found the arguments
convincing, persuading them to potentially agree.
• Finally, raters were asked to rate the overall strength of the arguments which is meant to
convey how strong the argument is using all of the previous criteria and any other criteria
the rater deemed relevant.
GAY RIGHTS
Transcript
[I don’t really have anything to say about this topic. I have mixed feelings and am not sure I
know enough about all angles on this topic to comment. ]
Validity
Effectiveness
Overall

Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average
Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average
Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average

To what extent do you believe that THIS PARTICIPANT will able to make valid arguments
about this issue in a discussion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Definitely Able
THE ENVIRONMENT
Transcript
[I think that a law that requires manufacturers to increase fuel economy is unfair. I don’t think the
government should be able to tell car companies how to run their business. If consumers want
fuel efficient cars then the manufacturers can compete to make the most fuel efficient car in order
to meet this demand. The same is true for recycling. I think energy conservation is important, but
it shouldn’t be mandated. ]
Validity
Effectiveness
Overall
Strength

Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average
Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average
Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average

To what extent do you believe that this participant will be able to make valid arguments
about this issue in a discussion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Definitely Able
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IMMIGRATION
Transcript
[I am sort of undecided when it comes to immigration. On one hand I think that because of the all
the drug cartels coming out of Mexico and the kidnappings that we should make serious efforts to
protect our border. On the other hand I don’t think that the new law that allows police to stop
people they think “look like illegal immigrants” is fair because I think it is racial profiling. They
wouldn’t stop a white person to see if they were illegal.]
Validity
Effectiveness
Overall
Strength

Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average
Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average
Poor _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Excellent
Average

To what extent do you believe that this participant will be able to make valid arguments
about this issue in a discussion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Definitely Able
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YOUR REACTIONS:
Please indicate your degree of agreement with each of the following statements:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Slightly
Neutra
Slightly
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
l
Agree
Agree
1. Overall, I had a positive reaction to the points others raised in the discussion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2. More often than not, I disliked what others in the group had to say.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3. I felt good about the opinions expressed by the group.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
4. I found that I felt negatively about what the group was saying.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5. I believe I made strong arguments in favor of my position.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6. I believe that I learned things that made me reconsider my position.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7. I believe the experience made me stronger in my original position.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8. I felt pressure to go along with the group.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9. Most of the students from MSU are not open minded enough to appreciate my
position.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
10. I didn't want to upset anyone.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
11. It’s important to me that other people did not think I was biased.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
12. I didn’t worry about offending people in the group.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
13. I felt uncomfortable in the group.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
14. I felt others knew more about the issue than I did.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
15. It was important to me to get along with people in the group.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
16. I just didn't really care about the issue enough to really get involved.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
17. I felt like I didn't belong in the discussion/group.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
18. I felt I was able to produce valid arguments in the discussion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
19. I was not confident in my thoughts during the discussion.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
74

20. I was confident that my thoughts were accurate.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
21. I felt like I lost some confidence in my thoughts about the issue that was
discussed.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Participant #:

YOUR FINAL WORD:
Please indicate your degree of agreement with each of the following statements
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Slightly
Neutral
Slightly
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree
1. Homosexuals should be allowed to marry, legally.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2. Sexual orientation should be included as a protected class in anti-discrimination
policies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3. Sexual orientation should be included as a protected class in anti-hate crime laws.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
4. Homosexuals should be able to adopt children
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5. The armed forces are right to exclude homosexuals from military service.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6. Employers should provide health care benefits to the partners of their gay and lesbian
employees.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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